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iiiAbstract
Corporate Governance deals with the issue, how suppliers of nance to corporations
assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. Several Studies have ex-
amined the relationship between managerial ownership and rm performance. Using
dierent samples most of the studies provide general support for the argument that
increase in managerial ownership increases rm performance. However, these results
have been questioned recently.
This work examines empirically the eects of ownership structure on the rm perfor-
mance for a large sample of Indian Corporate Firms, from an 'agency perspective'.
We examine the literature on this topic by examining the eect of interactions be-
tween corporate, foreign, nancial, institutional, and managerial ownership. We pro-
vide empirical evidence, which suggests that rm size and age in non-linearly related
to the rm performance. Using panel data framework, we show that a large fraction
of cross-sectional variation, in performance, found in several studies, is explained by
unobserved rm heterogeneity, rather than the share holders holding. We do not nd
any evidence that the dierences in Ownership structure, aect rm performance;
after controlling for observed rm characteristics and rm xed eects.
JEL Classication: G32; G34.
Keywords: corporate governance, share holding pattern and rm performance.
1 Introduction
Corporate Governance is the system of control mechanisms, through which \the
supplier of nance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their in-
vestment,'' (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). The classical problem is the separation of
ownership and control, i.e. the agency cost resulting from a divergence of interest
between the owners and the managers of the rm,(Jensen and Meckling 1976).
The separation of ownership and control has been a long-standing concern in corpo-
rate nance. The conict between managers and owners has been studied extensively
1by researchers seeking to understand the nature of the rm. In 1932, Berle and Means
(Berle and Means 1932), claimed that the increasing professionalization of manage-
ment would lead to rms being run for the managers benet rather than for owners.
\...the position of ownership has changed from that of an active to that of a passive
agent. In place of actual physical properties over which the owner could exercise
direction and for which he was responsible, the owner now holds a piece of paper rep-
resenting a set of rights and expectations with respect to an enterprise. But over the
enterprise and over the physical property- the instruments of production- in which he
had invest, the owner has little control ..." (pg. 64).
The principal-agent framework is used by Jensen and Meckling (1976), to explain
the conict of interests between managers and share-holders. The agency problem,
developed by Coase (1937), Fama and Jensen (1983), Jensen and Meckling (1976)
is an essential part of the contractual view of the rm. A rich empirical literature
has investigated the ecacy of alternative mechanisms. A rather small literature has
attempted to test directly, Berle and Means hypothesis: managers fail to maximize
rm value where they are not themselves signicant share-holders.
The empirical evidence on this point is mixed. Using US data from early 1930s,
Stigler and Fridland (1983) found no evidence in favor of Berle and Means hypothe-
sis. Similarly, using recent data Demsetz and Lenn (1985), found no relation between
rm performance, and ownership concentration. while Ahuja and Majumdar (1998),
Chibber and Majumdar (1998: 1999), Khanna and Palepu (1999: 2000), Majumdar
(1998a: b), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Patibandla (2002), Mork, Shleifer and
Vishny (1988) and Sarkar and Sarkar (2000)found a signicant relation between rm
value and ownership concentration.
These ndings have recently been questioned by Agrawal and Knober (1996), Him-
melberg et. al (1999) and Habib and Ljungquist (2000), they nd no evidence for the
relationship between rm value and managerial stock-holdings, and concluded that
managerial stock-holding are optimally chosen over the long run.
Our work continues with the lines of enquiry, in that it explores the link between
rm value and share-holding pattern in a panel of 530 publicly traded Indian Cor-
2porate Firms over the years from 1991 to 1999. Its contribution is three-fold. First,
we employ an econometric framework (Panel Data) that specically controls for rm
specic unobserved heterogeneity and aggregate macro-economic shocks. Second,
it uses exact share-holdings by dierent groups of owner, controlling for change in
rm value due to small change in share-holding pattern ( not exactly changing the
dominance of a group), as in most of the cases share-holding pattern do not change
dramatically. Finally, our analysis shows that no group of owners conrm to Berle
and Means hypothesis, as it is unobserved heterogeneity which gets reected in own-
ers eect if not controlled. Some of the issues addressed in this paper have also been
analyzed with Indian data in some recent studies by Ahuja and Majumdar (1998),
Chibber and Majumdar (1998: 1999), Khanna and Palepu (1999: 2000), Majumdar
(1998a: b), Patibandla (2002)and Sarkar and Sarkar (1999: 2000).
While Chibber and Majumdar, analyzes the relation between foreign ownership and
company performance, using the accounting measures (ROA and ROS), they do not
focus on the larger issue of the role of other major share-holders. (Khanna and
Palepu 1999: 2000)examines the rm performance of group vs. stand alone rms.
Sarkar and Sarkar (1999: 2000) examine the rm performance with the relation to
eective monitoring by owners of companies using a spline specication. However,
none of the studies have tried to look into the question with a wider prospective in
view of corporate governance, controlling for unobserved rm heterogeneity.
In our analysis, we do not nd any evidence for eect of share-holding pattern, once
we control for the unobserved rm heterogeneity eect. Where as, some rm specic
controls, do reect signicant eect on rm performance. For example, age and size
has a positive eect on rm performance with decreasing rate, advertising intensity,
export intensity, marketing intensity and import intensity have positive and signi-
cant eect on rm performance. Leverage has a negative eect on rm performance.
No evidence is found for R&D intensity. However, in our analysis we do nd evidence
for the eect of share-holding pattern on rm performance if we do not control for
the rm specic unobserved heterogeneity. In this case, FORE, CORP, and DIR
have positive eect and FII has negative eect on the rm's performance.
3Rest of the study is organized as follows: We discuss the existing research on Cor-
porate Governance briey in Section 2. In Section 3. we discuss the theory and
implications proposed by earlier studies in the Indian context, followed by a simple
theory of Corporate Ownership Structure and the proposed hypothesis. Data, Insti-
tutional Details and variable denitions are presented in Section 4. We discuss the
results in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6 with a summary, we further look into
potential avenues for further research.
2 Research on Corporate Governance
From a rm specic point of view, ownership is supposed to be one of the major
factors inuencing the rms protability enjoyed by the economic agents involved in,
. In particular, ownership structure is an incentive device for reducing the agency
costs, which can be used to protect property rights, which can not be fully contracted
out(Barbosa and Louri 2002).
The theoretical literature on corporate governance proposes six main dierent mech-
anisms to control for agency costs.
 Ownership Structure(Jensen and Meckling 1976)(Shleifer and Vishny 1986)
 Capital Structure(Jensen 1986)
 Board Structure
 Managerial Remuneration(Jensen and Mourphy 1990)
 Product Market Competition(Hart 1983)
 Takeover Market(Shleifer and Vishny 1988, Fama and Jensen 1983, Jensen and
Warner 1988). 1
While theoretical analysis of corporate governance deliver counteracting mechanisms,
empirical literature sheds light on the relative weight of these counteracting mech-
anisms, suggesting rm value is an outcome of control conicts. As Large share-
holdings are common in the world, except the US and the UK La Porta at. al (1999).
1For a detailed survey of the studies, (see Megginson and Netter 2001, Shleifer and Vishny 1997).
4Giving large share-holders incentive to collect information and to monitor manage-
ment, reducing agency costs (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). 2
2.1 The Changing Role of Corporate Governance Prin-
cipals
2.1.1 Families, Corporations and other Block-holders
Concentrated Ownership plays a predominant role in the way rms are governed.
Controlling owners are the center of gravity of these systems; high in stability and
long-term commitment, but low in exibility and the capacity to attract outside
investment.
2.1.2 Management
The Corporate Governance discussion started along the lines of the Berle and Means
(1932) paradigm of large corporations with their share ownership dispersed among
small share-holders, and eectively run by their management. Management in turn
is seen to wield enormous power because of the high monitoring costs and pervasive
free rider problems encountered by the share-holders/principals. Eective control by
managers allows them to pursue their own opportunistic goals instead of maximizing
the present value of the rm to its share-holders. It is well known that the managerial
behavior is aected by the management in the current period, however, there could
be an eect of managerial behavior on rm performance in future periods also (see
Short et. al 2002;for more detailed analysis).
2.1.3 Financial Institutions
Market developments are obliging nancial institutions to adapt their governance-
related activities. In this, they try to pursue \arms-length'' relationship with com-
panies in which they invest, and to defend their interests by selling shares when
2For a survey of empirical studies on the impact of ownership structure on corporate performance, (see
Short 1994).
5performance failed to live up to their expectations.
2.1.4 The Government
Widespread government ownership in the economy results in blurring the lives be-
tween the legitimate public interest in the way certain goods and services are supplied
to the population of such goods.
The theoretical literature on ownership considers two types of problems associated
with state (government) ownership: the political problem. That political interference
distorts the objectives and constraints faced by managers (Shleifer and Vishny 1994)
and the managerial problem. That poor monitoring leads to low-powered incentives
among managers.(La Porta at. al 1999).
3 Theory and Empirical Implications
If complete contracts could be written and enforced, ownership structure should not
be a matter (Hart 1983, Coase 1960). In general, public sector rms are argued to be
less ecient than private sector rms (in relatively competitive markets) due to low-
powered managerial incentives. There could be \political" reasons, as government
pursues multiple objectives, some of which, unlike prot maximization, are hard to
be contracted upon. Ownership in such cases makes a dierence, when unforseen
contingencies arise, which are not contracted.
The long string of agency relationship that characterize today's large rms, and the
impossibility to write complete contracts between principals and agents on the exact
tasks of the latter. As : `governance structures can be seen as a mechanism for
making decisions that have not been specied by contract.'
Firms nd themselves following conicting incentives; neither public interest nor the
commercial objectives are met.
63.1 Recent empirical studies on Public vs Private own-
ership in India
 Chibber and Majumdar (1998), using industry level survey data (ASI), com-
pare performance of SOEs,MEs, and private Indian rms for 1973-89. SOEs
and MEs account for 37% of employment and 66% of capital investment in
1989. They document that eciency scores averaging 0.975 for private rms
are signicantly higher than averages of 0.912 for MEs and 0.638 for SOEs.
A concern with Chibber's study is of aggregated data. In addition, he could
provide little insight into the reasons for the eciency dierences between the
sectors. They suggest that there is the opportunity cost for the state to invest
in mixed enterprises from which it can not draw positive yields.
 Ahuja and Majumdar (1998), Majumdar (1998a: b), discuss the relationship
between the levels of debt in the capital structure and rm performance. While
existing theory posits a positive relationship, data reveals negative relationship.
A supply of loan capital is government- owned, they support privatization.
They conclude that a higher level of debt is associated with higher level of per-
formance. Bad loans are possible in case of state owned nancial institutions.
The greater the quantum of debt in the capital structure, the greater is the
proigacy or the lack of eort on the part of the managers, unlike the situa-
tion where privately owned debt suppliers can exercise a check on discretionary
managerial behavior and corporate performance is negatively impacted.
Where, the state-owned nancial institutions primarily supply debt capital, a
negative relationship will be noted between the level of debt and performance.
In this work, they have used cross-sectional data. Here the variable is dened
as percentage of protability to sales, i.e. return on net worth.
As there is structural change in nancial performance of the Indian rms. Then
the question arises that whether unexpected change in the levels of debt supplied
by the state owned institutions which has a one time eect on the performance
can be evaluated via the mechanism of event study.
7 Chibber and Majumdar (1998: 1999), test the inuence of foreign ownership on
performance of rms operating in India. Performance is measured by the return
on sales and return on assets. They use Cross-sectional data in the analysis.
Rather than capturing ownership, variation through looking at categories such
as domestic versus state ownership or joint ventures versus wholly owned sub-
sidiaries, they look only at ownership variations that have a legal bias in Indian
Companies Act of 1956.
Foreign ownership is found to have a positive and signicant inuence on vari-
ous diminution of rm performance, but it only does so when it crosses a certain
threshold, and one that is dened by the property rights regime.
 Sarkar and Sarkar (1999: 2000), using rm level balance sheet data for 1995-
96 provide evidence on the role of large shareholders in monitoring company
value. They nd that block-holdings by Directors increases company value af-
ter a certain level of holdings, however they do not nd any evidence of active
governance from Institutional Investors. They also highlight that foreign eq-
uity ownership has a benecial eect on company value By adopting a spline
methodology they document that for each type of large shareholder, the incen-
tives for monitoring, changes signicantly when ownership stakes rise beyond a
particular threshold.
They document that foreign ownership has a benecial eect on company value.
i.e. identity of large shareholders matter in corporate governance. It is a cross-
sectional analysis of listed manufacturing rms for 1995-96 and the model is
specied as an spline function.
The specication test did not detect any signicant presence of heteroscedas-
ticity in the regression equations.
Results suggest that the incremental eect of the foreign corporate holdings on
company value is higher than that of FII, though a strict comparison should
look at the relative eects of these two groups in comparable ranges of owner-
ship. Foreign holding do increase company value even at low level of holdings.
8As the level of debt holding increases, development nancial institutions seem
to extent a positive and signicant impact on company value, suggesting that
these institutions step up their controlling and monitoring activities with higher
levels of debt. While a detailed theoretical and empirical analysis is needed to
understand the underlying dynamics of result, time stability of regression re-
sults is open to questions.
 Khanna and Palepu (1999: 2000), using business groups level data from 1993
nd that rm performance initially decline with group diversication and sub-
sequently increase once group diversication exceeds a certain level.
 Gupta (2001), using rm level data of government owned rms from 1993-98,
document that even the sale of minority stakes has a positive impact on rm
performance and productivity. She nds that privatization and competition
have a complementary impact on rm performance.
 Patibandla (2002),using rm level data from 1989 to 1999 from CMIE, show
that foreign ownership in positively related with the rm performance. In their
analysis they do not take into account the major factures inuencing the rm's
nancial performance, and their model specication is not fully justied.
3.2 Theory of Corporate Governance and Firm Perfor-
mance
Jensen and Meckling (1976), integrating elements from the theory of agency, the
theory of property rights and the theory of nance develop a theory of the ownership
structure of the rm. They suggest, there is an optimal ratio of insider to outsider
ownership.
Suppose, an investor i, considering to invest in a rm's equity, has J alternative
9choices regarding the ownership structure. The protability of each alternative, say
ij; can be derived as a function of its costs, benets and potential risks. An investor
will choose to invest in the rm, with the ownership structure j if and only if,
ij > ik; 8 k 2 J; k 6= j (1)
When the expected economic gains from investment in rm j, is higher than the
organizational and coordination costs, investor i will choose to invest in rm j. Oth-
erwise, available alternative will be chosen. That is, the process of weighing costs
and benets of various ownership structures will shape the investors preferences. In
our conceptual framework, inspired mainly by Barbosa and Louri (2002), the optimal
ownership structure is assumed to be chosen optimally from a process of weighing
costs and benets of various ownership structures. That is to say that a rms' perfor-
mance does not depend on the ownership structure and in long run, investors choose
an optimal mix of insider vs outsider ownership, provided there is no restriction on
the share holders holding, which was the case in India few years back.
Share holdings dier with regard to the percentage of equity owned by investors,
since an investor may choose to own the equity of the rm based on a variety of
economic or strategic reasons. Whereas rms performance, in terms of higher mar-
ket share holders and prots, may depend on the ownership structure. Jensen and
Meckling (1976), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), proposes that large investors are able
to protect their investment better than large number of small investors, because of
their incentive and ability in controlling the agency costs.
3.2.1 Hypothesis
The hypothesis postulated is that, in contrast to Chibber and Majumdar (1998: 1999),
Majumdar (1998a: b), Sarkar and Sarkar (1999: 2000), share holding pattern does not
leads to a relationship between performance and ownership structure, as the optimal
ownership structure is chosen over time.
H1: Firm performance is unrelated to the percentage of shares held by
10investors.
Firm performance may depend on managers knowledge about the market, consumers
and its reputation in the market. Which is in the relation to learning by doing ar-
guments, suggesting rms age may be one of the determinants of the performance.
But with increasing age rms may be reluctant to employ the changes in technology
or managerial structure leading to lower performance which is treated as `rigidity
eect'. It may yield a negative relation between performance and age.
H2: Firm performance is positively related to its age.
Large rms may have positive benets, as they may have better penetration in the
market (input as well as output), compared to the smaller rms. They may exercise
economies of scale. Large size enables greater diversication and specialization, on
the other hand it makes the managers task more dicult due to increased coordina-
tion requirements. From the perspective of governance, the better managers should
be appointed to the larger rms, therefore larger rm's performance should be better
(Ahuja and Majumdar 1998, Das 1995).
H3: Firm performance is positively related to size.
If, as is hypothesized here, a positive relationship exists between size, age and rm
performance and no relationship exists between rm performance and ownership
structure, the presence of large share holders holders would be expected to moderate
the hypothesized positive relationship between age and size with rm performance.
4 Data and Institutional Details
4.1 Data sources and Sample selection
For our study of ownership structure (share-holding pattern) and its eect on rm
performance, in emerging markets, we focus our attention on Indian Corporate Sec-
tor. We choose this as an experimental setting Indian Corporate Sector oers the
following advantages over other emerging market economies.
 The Indian Corporate Sector has several hundred rms, lending itself to large
11sample statistical analysis.
 It is large by emerging market standards and the contribution of the industrial
and manufacturing sectors value added is close to that in several advanced
economies.
 Unlike several other emerging markets, rms in India, typically maintain their
share-holding pattern over the period of study (Patibandla 2002), making it
possible to identify the ownership aliation of each sample rm with clarity.
 It is by and large a hybrid of the \outsider systems" of countries like USA,UK
and the \insider systems" of countries like Continental Europe and Japan
(Sarkar and Sarkar 2000).
 The legal framework for regulation of all corporate activities including gover-
nance and administration of companies, disclosures, share-holders rights, has
been in place since the enactment of the Companies Act in 1956 and has been
fairly stable. The listing agreement of stock exchanges have also been prescrib-
ing on-going conditions and continuous obligations for companies. 3
 At no time has India faced the kind of nancial crisis, which has aected the
economies of East Asia in terms of exchange rates, large current account decits,
scal imprudence, disproportionate external nancial exposure, imbalance be-
tween short term and long term liabilities, and lax nancial supervision.
 India has had a well established regulatory framework for more than four
decades, which forms the foundation of the corporate governance system in
India.
 Although the Indian Corporate Sector is a mix of government and private rms
(which are again a mix of independent rms and those owned by business group
families, and multi nationals), it has not suered from the cronyism that has
dominated some of the Asian Economies, nor does the Indian Corporate Sector
possess the characteristics of the Korean chaebols(OECD 2001).
3For more discussion on this see pg. 249, (OECD 2001).
12 Accounting systems in India are prepared according to well established ac-
counting standards that are similar to those followed in most of the advanced
economies (Khanna and Palepu 2000).
This increases our condence in the reliability of the data. The rm level data
for our study here is primarily obtained from the corporate database (PROWESS)
maintained by CMIE, the Center for Monitoring the Indian Economy. The data
set used in the analysis consists of all manufacturing rms listed on Bombay Stock
Exchange (BSE), with the required data. Public Sector rms are not included in the
analysis as their performance is inuenced by a large number of social obligations,
which may be complex to account for. Firms within nancial services segments
are removed form consideration, because applying our valuation method to them, is
problematic, as earnings before interest and taxes are not meaningful for nancial
companies. We conne our analysis to BSE listed rms only because all the listed
rms are required to follow the norms set by Securities and Exchange Board of
India(SEBI) for announcing the nancial accounts. The BSE also has the second
largest number of domestic quoted companies on any stock exchange in the world
after NYSE, and more quoted companies than either London or Tokyo.
We analyze data from 1991 to 1999, as this is the period for which we have the
most coverage in the database. Also, during the 1990's India went for liberalization,
allowing diversied share-holding pattern of Corporate rms. There are 530 rms in
our nal sample, for which we have required data of at least 3 consecutive years.
We restrict ourselves to rms which have no missing data (on sales, age, ownership
pattern, prots and assets ) for at least 3 consecutive years. 4 (We can not avoid
this conditioning because we can not use rms with missing data for fewer than 3
years of data for our analysis). There are 530 rms spread over 3-10 years, resulting
in an unbalanced panel of 2,251 rm years. Thus, we avoid exacerbating the scope
for sampling bias by not requiring a balanced panel.
For this unbalanced panel of 2,251 observations, we collect the following additional
data for each rm observation: advertising, distribution, depreciation expenditures,
4We delete observations, where values reported are missing, zero or negative for capital stock, sales and
age.
13imports, exports etc.
Despite the problem of attrition and missing data , our sample provides several
distinct advantages over the samples used in earlier studies.
In contrast to studies that focus on sample of large rms, our sample includes a much
larger number of small rms and is more representative of the typical rm in Indian
Corporate Sector.
We have a panel of rms rather than a cross-section, which allows us to control for
rm level xed (random) eects. Although data from the same source, CMIE, has
been used in other contexts, this is the rst to include share-holding pattern in a
panel framework.
Though our sample may suer from selection bias and attrition, we deliberately
construct our sample, as a panel to control for the sample selection which arrises due
to the lack of the data (for share-holding pattern) and attrition.
4.2 Variables
The key variables of the interest are measures of rm performance (protability),
the return on assets(ROA), managerial share-holding pattern (DIR), nancial in-
stitutions share-holding pattern (FI), foreign investors share-holding pattern (FOR)
and Corporate share-holding pattern (CORP). Furthermore, in order to examine the
underlying hypothesis, it is necessary to control for other possible determinants of
rm performance not captured by the ownership variables. The control variables
used in the study have been selected with reference to those employed in empirical
studies (see Himmelberg et. al 1999, Habib and Ljungquist 2000). We further add a
large number of explanatory variables to proxy for managerial discretion as well as
to control for rm specic heterogeneity (observed), namely, age, size, export inten-
sity, import intensity, advertising, R&D, depreciation, distribution expenditure etc?.
Year dummies are included to control for contemporaneous macroeconomic shocks.
We use accounting measure of performance instead of stock market valuation of rm
performance as used by several studies. Because our data set consists of observations
from 1991-1999, while the share price data is available only 1996 onwards. As well
14as, since the share market is still in its infancy, therefore we can't expect the share
prices of the rms to correctly reect the actual rm performance. While accounting
measures do lack in taking accounting of the future prospects of rm performance,
they do take into account the current status of the rm performance. As the current
rm performance is actually what the owners of the rm get from it. Whereas share
market measures of rm performance runs into sever problem, when used in emerging
market context. As most of the rms, go for debt nancing in these economies than
share market. Therefore, share market measures do not reect the actual prots
made by the investors on their investments.
These variables are described below and a summary list is provided in the Appendix.
4.2.1 Variable Denitions
The key variables of the interest are measures of performance, share-holding pattern
and age of the rm. Furthermore, in order to examine our hypothesis detailed in
section 3, it is necessary to control for other possible determinants of performance
not captured by the ownership variables. The control variables used in this study
have been selected with reference to those employed in previous empirical studies
,(see Himmelberg et. al 1999;in particular), Therefore, in addition to ownership , it
is hypothesized that the rm performance is aected by rm size, scope for discre-
tionary spending, age, capital and assets. These variables are described below and
also in the Appendix.
Size. rm size has an ambiguous eect a priori on the rm performance. On one hand,
larger rms can be less ecient than smaller ones, because of the loss of control by
top managers over strategic and operational activities within the rm (Himmelberg
et. al 1999, Williamson 1967, Sarkar and Sarkar 2000). In addition, large rms are
likely to exploit economies of scale, employ more skilled managers and the formaliza-
tion of procedures may lead to better performance. It also measures a rm's market
power or the level of concentration in the industries in which the rm operates. Such
characteristics make the implementation of operations more eective, allowing large
rms to generate greater returns on assets and sales as well as to capture more value
15as a proportion of the value of the production, leading to a higher rm performance.
We use the log of sales, lsale, and its square lsale2, to measure rm size.
Age. Firm age has an ambiguous eect a priori on rm performance. As older rms
give experience-based economies of scale based on learning, they can enjoy supe-
rior performance compared to new comers and can avoid the liabilities of newness.
However, classic economic writing by Alfred Marshall5 suggests that older rms are
prone to inertia, and rigidities in adaptability, which may lead to lower performance.
However, literature in learning by doing suggests age-performance relation to be an
\S-shaped". We measure age, as the number of years since inception to the date of
observation.
Capital Intensity. Firms with higher concentration on \hard" capital in their inputs
will have better performance. The rms operating with higher capital-to-sales ratio,
impose entry barrier and thus enjoy better control over the market, than it would
have been otherwise. We use the rms capital-to-sales ratio,k int, as measure of the
relative importance of hard capital in the rm's technology.
R&D Intensity, Advertising Intensity, Distribution Intensity, Marketing Intensity.
Such expenditures of a rm may yield positive returns in future, improving rm per-
formance.It is measured as ratio of total expenditure to sales. These variables are
used to control for the operational aspects, based on empirical performance studies
and literature reviewed in Cui and Mak (2002), Caves (1996). We initially include
dummy variables when R&D (rdum) and Advertising (adum) expenditures are miss-
ing to control for the possibility that reporting rms are dierent from non-reporting
rms, but due to less variation and insignicant contribution in terms of explanatory
power of the model, we do not use them in our nal regression.
Investment Rate. A proxy for the link between opportunity for discretionary projects
and high growth, as well as rms willingness to invest in new projects. Which are
risky as well as provide high returns, we measure investment rate as the ratio of
capital expenditure to capital stock.
Export Intensity. Exposure to foreign trade exerts pressure on rms to attain supe-
5Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economies, 8th ed.1920
16rior performance, lower cost and better quality. rms with higher export intensity
face competitive pressure from rms in international markets. Export pressures thus
raise competitive intensity and reduces ineciencies in rms (Chibber and Majum-
dar 1998). We use exports to sales ratio as a measure of export intensity.
Import Intensity. Firms with higher level of imported capital in their capital structure
may outperform rms with lower share-holding pattern of imported capital goods.
Firms with high intensity of imported capital goods are less inecient, and their
capital utilization is higher. Suggesting that level of imports of capital undertaken
by a rm is likely to aect performance. We measure import of capital goods to
sales. Summary of our variables is listed in Appendix.
5 The Empirical Model
Himmelberg et. al (1999) have argued that regression of rm performance on own-
ership variables is potentially misspecied because of the presence of the rm het-
erogeneity. Specically, if some of the unobserved determinants of rm performance
are also determinants of ownership, then ownership might spuriously appear to be
a determinant of rm performance. Hence, combining the rm specic observable
variables associated with share-holding pattern yields the following reduced form
expression for the rm performance:
ROAit = f(FOREit;FIIit;CORPit;DIRit;lsaleit;ageit;leverageit;export intit; (2)
import intit;rd intit;adv intit;dis intit;cap intit;mkt intit) + ui + it
where i and t represent the rm and periods, respectively,ui is the rm-specic eect,
and it is a white-noise error term.
yit =  + (ownership)it + Xit + (year)t + it (3)
17Where (ownership)it variables measures the fraction of the equity of rm i, lying
between 0 and 100, that is owned by dierent group of owners in period t. The Xit
variables are rm-specic factors. This specication allows for a rm-specic xed
eect i, which reects xed eects dierences across rms that are constant but
unobserved over time, time eects which are common to rms but vary over time
given by year dummies (year), and a random unobserved component it.
The main advantage of a xed eect estimation model is that it would control for
the selection biases.(see Gupta 2001;pg. 18)
5.1 Empirical Evidence from India
The empirical evidence is based on the rm level panel data for 8 Indian Manufactur-
ing Industries over the period of 1990 to 1999. Percentage share-holding of dierent
investors (FORE, FII, CORP, and DIR) are correlated, because, these shares, along
with the shares of other top 50 shareholders and others not included so far (which
are not considered here) adds upto `100' and if one of them increases then at least
one of the others have to decrease. In order to avoid multi- collinearity, we use only
four main share-holders, i.e. FORE, FII, CORP, and DIR. We also use 1-digit 2-digit
and 3-digit level industry dummies, based on industrial classication ASI-NIC'1998
by NSSO.
Summary statistics relating to the variables used in the analysis are shown in Table
1 and a detailed data structure is presented in Table 2 & 3. Inspection of Table 1
reveals that the mean DIR ownership level of the whole sample is 14.34% with a
standard deviation of 18%. The mean percentage share holders holding of FORE,
in the whole sample is 14.08% with a standard deviation of 17.66%. CORP's mean
ownership level of the whole sample is 24.73% with a standard deviation of 18.78%
and FII's mean share holding is 14.08% with a standard deviation of 16.08%. Distri-
bution of sample rms across dierent industries is reported in Table 2, and Table 3
provides yearly availability of the data in rm years, and the number of rms avail-
able if balanced vs. unbalanced data set is constructed out of the whole sample.
18The results of our empirical analysis are reported in Table.5. 6, regresses ROA on
a simple collection of rm-specic variables, a collection of industry dummies along
with time dummies. The rm-specic variables include age, lsale, lsale2, adv int,
mkt int, exp int, imp int, excise int, and rdum and FORE, FII, CORP, and DIR.
The regression, signicant at 5% level, is carried out on 2,251 observations, for which
the required data is available.
ROA is a non-linear function of size (which depends on the industry). 7 The owner-
ship variables show a positive eect of FORE, CORP and DIR and negative eect of
FIIs. This regression specication suggests that rms with higher concentration of
share-holdings by FII, under perform. Using dierent measures of size (such as sales
or assets or logarithm of assets) does not change any of these results qualitatively
Results are reported in Table. 6 & 7 (Dropping one industry at a time) Some more
robustness tests are reported in Table. 8 & 9. We also use the specication suggested
by Patibandla (2002) results are reported in Table.10. We also use other performance
measures but our results remains the same, see Table.11. 8.
Age has a strong positive impact on rm performance. This may be because of vari-
ous reasons. First, although rms in mature as well as infant industries keep learning
about their own eciencies over time and nd their niches in the product market as
they age, the returns of such learning may be diminishing in a mature industry and
increasing in an infant industry. Second, in an infant industry, learning about the
existence of the new product, by consumer may increase over the age of the produc-
ing rm, leading to a positive impact on its performance. Third, with age a rm's
reputation might be enhanced. The managerial return from such reputation building
may be high in an infant industry, leading to a positive impact on rm performance
(Das 1995).
In Table.5 column 4 & 7, we repeat the specication of Table.5 column 2 & 5, using
6We also perform several analysis to reinforce the choice of functional form. For example, we use
MBVR,PQ Ratio as another proxy for rm performance, as suggested by(Sarkar and Sarkar 2000). In due
course our sample size reduces, as the share price data is available only from 1996 onwards. Results are
available from the authors.
7The coecient estimates for the industry dummies are not reported.
8Inclusion of more controls or use of dierent spline specication for ownership variables, do not change
any of our results qualitatively. Which is also consistent with the results of (Sarkar and Sarkar 2000)
19the same sample of rms. In this specication we use rm dummies rather than
industry dummies to capture the unobserved rm heterogeneity. Here we do not nd
any evidence for the eect of share-holding on rm performance, by dierent class
of share-holders. This result is in contrast to the results obtained in Table.5, with
1-digit and 2-digit industry dummies. The other dierence is, rm size eects ROA
positively with increasing rate and age eects ROA negatively with decreasing rate
and the eects here are signicant at 5% level of signicance.
These point estimates suggests that rm performance is not aected by dierent class
of share-holders and actually it is the unobserved rm-specic heterogeneity, which
gets reected in ownership variables, when we do not control for it. This result is sim-
ilar to the results of Himmelberg et. al (1999) and suggests that the share-holdings are
optimally chosen. These results are in contrast to those obtained by several authors in
the Indian context, for example, Chibber and Majumdar (1998: 1999), Gupta (2001),
Khanna and Palepu (1999: 2000), Patibandla (2002), Sarkar and Sarkar (2000). Us-
ing data of Indian rms they have found a signicant positive relation between rm
performance and concentrated share-holdings by some class of owners.
A negative relationship of leverage with rm performance is found, which is in con-
trast to the Western economies. It may be because in India, suppliers of debt are
mainly government-owned nancial institutions.
We also show that industry eects are insucient to remove the unobserved hetero-
geneity compared to rm xed eects.
As a robustness check, we repeat our analysis using ROS and Y S as an alternative
measure for the rm performance. Results are reported in Table.6 & 7, respectively.
We also perform and conclude that our results are not driven by outliers or account-
ing biases.9
We also estimate the model with instrumental variables, using 2-lag values as instru-
ments. We do not nd any endogenity in the model, which was found in Himmelberg
et. al (1999). Results of the Instrumental variable model is reported in Table 9. We
also conduct some other robustness checks. In particular we reestimate the model
9Reestimating the results in Table.5, using MBVR, PQ Ratio and ROE, show that there is no change
in either the sign or the signicance for the point estimates of the ownership variables.
20excluding one industry at a time form the sample. We do not nd any evidence that
these results are being driven by any particular sectors. Each of these leaves our
main conclusions qualitatively unchanged. Our nal results based on xed eects
panel regression are reported in Table 8.
6 Conclusion
This study has examined empirically the relationship between the ownership struc-
ture and rm performance. Four aspects of ownership have been considered : equity
ownership by DIR, equity ownership by FORE, equity ownership by FII and equity
ownership by CORP. The results presented, in this study suggests that, for Indian
Corporate Firms, performance and ownership is unrelated in the long run.
We nd that a large fraction of cross-sectional variation in share-holding pattern
is explained by unobserved rm heterogeneity. Suggesting, the unobserved hetero-
geneity has important implications for econometric models, to estimate the eect of
share-holding pattern on rm performance. The results, do not provide any evidence
of the eects of ownership structure on the performance.
We conclude that the share-holding pattern does not inuence the rm performance
signicantly, and the agency problem is solved by the optimal ownership pattern in
the long run.
The results of similar studies on Indian data have produced contradictory results. It
is possible that the contradictory results can be accounted for by dierences in time
periods studied and in research design. Given the lack of previous work examining
the eects of ownership structure on performance of Indian Corporate Firms, with
panel data, it is dicult to make comparison between this and other studies. Some
comparison can be made with Himmelberg et. al (1999) US study, which, is consis-
tent with the present study, found performance and ownership to be unrelated, hence
suggesting ownership is optimally chosen over the long run.
However, given the contradictory results produced by the current study and the
prior Indian Research, it is clear that there are many questions relating to the rela-
21tionship between share holding pattern and performance of the rm, which remains
unsolved. There remains the task of nding out the mechanisms for the determina-
tion of share-holding pattern. One other useful extention of this analysis would be to
include additional policy variables measuring changes in the market conditions such
as trade policy changes, to see whether ownership structure changes dramatical or
not, if so to what extent and why? Do companies in emerging markets actually raise
substantial equity nance? Who are the buyers of this equity? If they are dispersed
minority shareholder, why are they buying equity despite the apparent absence of
minority protections?
22Appendix
Summary List of Variables
1. ROA (return on assets). We measure ROA as the ratio of return to total as-
sets. Where return is dened as the dierence between operating revenues and
expenditure before tax and interest payments. R&D expenditures are included
in operating expenditure in the year incurred, event though the R&D results
may produce technical breakthroughs, that will benet the rm for years to
come. We treat, therefore, R&D as investment rather than as current expendi-
ture. Total assets includes value of xed assets, investments and current assets.
ROA = Return/Total Assets = net profit + tax + interest + depreciation/
total assets.
2. ROS (return on sales). We measure ROS as the ratio of return to gross
sales, where return is dened as the dierence between operating revenues and
expenditure before tax and interest payments. R&D expenditures are included
in operating expenditure in the year incurred, event hough the R&D results may
produce technical breakthroughs that will benet the rm for years to come.
We treat, therefore, R&D as investment rather than as current expenditure.
ROS = Return/Total Sales = net profit + tax + interest + depreciation/
total sales.
3. Age is dened as the number of years since its inception.
Age = observation year - incorporation year. 10
4. Foreigners' Share Holding (FORE) is equity shares held by foreigners as
percentage of total equity shares. These includes foreign collaborators, foreign
nancial institutions, foreign nationals and non resident Indians.
5. Governments' Share Holding (GOV) is equity shares held by government
companies as percentage of total equity shares. These includes insurance com-
10Where incorporation year pertains to the most recent incarnation year of the rm. In the case of rms
that were reorganized, the year of incorporation may not reect the true age of a rm (age calculated as
above may give negative ages also). Therefore, we restrict our analysis to those rm-years whose age is
non-negative, as calculated.
23panies, mutual funds, nancial institutions, banks, central and state government
rms, state nancial Corporations and other government bodies.
6. Corporates' Share Holding (CORP) is equity shares held by Corporate
bodies as percentage of total equity shares. These includes Corporate bodies
excluding those already covered.
7. Directors' Share Holding (DIR) is equity shares held by directors of the
rm as dened in section 6 of the Companies Act, 1956. Which includes the
share held by the family members of the director.
8. Gross Sales (sales) denotes the revenue generated by an enterprise dur-
ing a given accounting period. It excludes other income and income from
non-recurring transactions, income of extra-ordinary nature and prior period
income. Sales are always taken gross of indirect taxes such as excise duties.
9. Sales of Manufacturing Goods (sales mfg) is the sales generated through
sale of its ownership manufactured goods.
Total Income = sales + other income + change in stocks
Net Sales = sales - indirect taxes
Operating Income = sales.
10. Total Raw Material Expenses (tot raw mat expense) is the total cost
of raw materials and stores consumed during the accounting period.
11. Total For-ex Earnings( total exports) is the total revenue earned from
exports of goods and services. Income earned in foreign currency by ways of
interest, dividend,royalties, and consultancy fees are also included here.
12. Total For-ex Spending (total imports) includes not only import of raw
materials etc. But also import of capital good as, foreign exchange spending
like interest, royalty, traveling expenses, etc.
13. Import of Raw Material (import raw mat) is the cost of imported raw
material, stores and spares.
14. Imported Capital Goods (import capital goods) is the value of imported
capital goods, plant and machinery etc.
2415. R&D Expenditure on Capital Account (r and d capital) is the capital
expense incurred by the rm in research and development.
R&D Expenditure on Current Account (r and d current) are the revenue ex-
penses incurred by the rm in research and development.
16. Equity Capital (equity capital) is the total outstanding paid up equity
capital of the rm as at the end of the accounting period. Shares issued but
not paid-up or pending allotments does not form part of equity capital. This
includes bonus equity shares issued, if any, by the rm in the past.
17. Total Borrowing (tot borrowing) includes all form of debt, interest bearing
or other wise.
18. Land & Building (land n building) is the value of land and building at
cost.
19. Plant & Machinery (plant n machinery) is the value of plant and ma-
chinery used in the production of goods and services at cost.
20. Investments (investments) is the investments in shares, debentures of rms,
PSU Bonds, Mutual fund schemes of UTI and other mutual funds etc. This
includes both quoted as well as unquoted investments.
21. Inventories (inventories) includes closing stocks of raw materials, stores
and spares, nished goods and semi-nished goods.
22. Total Assets (total assets) is the total assets of rm, including xed assets,
investments and current assets.
23. Long Term Borrowing (long term borrowing):
long term borrowing = tot borrowings + short term bank borr - commercial paper
24. Net Fixed Assets (nfa) is total xed asset net of accumulated depreciation.
25. RDUM (rdum) and ADUM (adum) are dummy variables for reporting of
the expenditure on account of R&D and Advertising respectively in the year.
25Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
roa 0.13299 0.09694 -0.5872 0.6650
ros 0.12662 0.81702 -23.8437 12.5
roi 60.6534 260.383 -1938 5746
y s 1.09866 0.11853 1 2.9865
fore 12.9101 17.6572 0 80.29
foreh2 478.312 1017.32 0 6446.484
fore1 5.15950 4.35248 0 10
fore2 7.08886 12.8143 0 40
fore3 0.66182 3.15845 0 30.29
i 14.0770 16.0766 0 99.79
ih2 456.508 1014.14 0 9958.044
i1 6.10952 4.25685 0 10
i2 7.38790 11.0866 0 40
i3 0.57966 4.19236 0 49.79
corp 24.7355 18.7784 0 79.17
corph2 964.318 1196.15 0 6267.889
corp1 8.28596 3.08450 0 10
corp2 15.3313 14.6774 0 40
corp3 1.11821 4.00974 0 29.17
dir 14.3360 18.0024 0 97.32
dirh2 529.464 1049.41 0 9471.183
dir1 5.37554 4.49770 0 10
dir2 8.23892 12.7083 0 40
dir3 0.72153 3.68656 0 47.32
age 25.0502 20.7303 0 135
lsale 4.06047 1.80032 -4.6051 11.0332
lsale2 19.7271 15.1161 .0003 121.7314
leverage 1.39770 15.4552 -107.6875 670.5
k int 1.76083 12.1333 0 327
adv int 0.00699 0.02849 0 1
exp int 0.12766 0.23094 0 1.4198
imp int 0.21068 2.40357 0 109.5
mkt int 0.01637 0.02782 0 0.4635
dis int 0.02057 0.03974 0 1
exc int 0.07314 0.07486 0 0.6233
rd int 0.00277 0.01137 0 0.3350
Details about the data structure, are provided in Table.2&3 .
26Table 2: Industry wise Data Structure of the sample
INDUSTRY # of obs.
(1)MINING AND QUARRYING 538
(2)MANUFACTURE OF MINAREL AND OTHER PRODUCTS 114
(3)MANUFACTURE OF ELECTRICAL MACHINERY AND APPARATUS NEC 272
(4)ELECTRICITY,GAS AND WATER 39
(5)CONSTRUCTION 15
(6)WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE AND RESTAURANTS AND HOTELS 12
(7)TRANSPORT, STORAGE AND COMMUNICATION 22
(8)DIVERSIFIED 141
Table 3: Number of observations (year wise and balanced panel wise)





1993 14 3 684 2251
1994 164 4 536 1567
1995 299 5 335 1031
1996 516 6 240 696
1997 525 7 287 456
1998 58 8 88 169
1999 45 9 81 81
27Table 4: Formula for variables construction




y s operating income/net sales
fore foreign holdings
foreh fore*fore
dir directors and their relatives holdings
dirh dir*dir
corp corporate bodies holdings
corph corp*corp
i government and nancial instituions
ih i*i
age years since the date of incorporation
mfg sales sales mfg/sales
lsale ln(sales)
lsale2 ln(sales)*ln(sales)
leverage tot borrowings /(equity capital + tot borrowings)
R&D (r and d capital +r and d current)
k land n building + plant n machinery
k int k/sales
adv int advertising expenditure/sales
exp int total exports/sales
imp int total imports/sales
mkt int marketing expences/sales
dis int distribution expences/sales
exc int excise tax/sales
rd int R&D/sales
28Table 5: Regressions for ROA
Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Group Dummy 1-digit 2-digit 3-digit Firm Level Firm Level
age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.021 -0.023
(0.7014) (0.3447) (0.3507) (0.0000)** (0.0000)**
lsale 0.035 0.036 0.039 0.056 0.056
(0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)**
lsale2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.005 0.005
(0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)**
exp int 0.007 0.011 0.006 0.043 0.044
(0.4409) (0.1927) (0.4741) (0.1111) (0.1064)
imp int 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.2640) (0.3402) (0.1536) (0.3227) (0.3179)
dis int -0.002 -0.043 -0.076 -0.513 -0.521
(0.9730) (0.5277) (0.2522) (0.0022)** (0.0019)**
exc int 0.020 -0.016 -0.016 -0.203 -0.205
(0.4743) (0.6441) (0.6517) (0.0039)** (0.0036)**
rd int 0.032 -0.077 -0.010 0.108 0.110
(0.8237) (0.5265) (0.9349) (0.3332) (0.3171)
adv int 0.141 0.208 0.214 0.157 0.162
(0.2341) (0.0988)+ (0.0858)+ (0.3551) (0.3382)
mkt int -0.055 -0.109 -0.084 -0.163 -0.172
(0.4583) (0.1547) (0.2248) (0.1177) (0.1036)
k int -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.3332) (0.2555) (0.7967) (0.0002)** (0.0002)**
leverage -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.4254) (0.5400) (0.6200) (0.7895) (0.7581)
fore 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.0058)** (0.0319)* (0.0277)* (0.6493) (0.5431)
i -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.0157)* (0.0041)** (0.0087)** (0.3154) (0.2775)
corp 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.1255) (0.1716) (0.1514) (0.9811) (0.8921)
dir 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.1861) (0.5299) (0.2978) (0.1458) (0.1455)
Observations 2251 2251 2251 2251 2251
No.of groups 530 530 530 530 530
R-squared
(within)
0.2936 0.2936 0.2936 0.2936 0.2920
Robust p values in parentheses
+ signicant at 10%; * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%
29Table 6: Regressions for ROA dropping one Industry at a time
Industry Ind-1 Ind-2 Ind-3 Ind-4
age -0.020 -0.024 -0.022 -0.021
(0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)**
lsale 0.062 0.065 0.050 0.056
(0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)**
lsale2 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005
(0.0042)** (0.0079)** (0.0000)** (0.0001)**
exp int 0.030 0.061 0.051 0.046
(0.4741) (0.0298)* (0.0685)+ (0.0925)+
imp int 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.2637) (0.3239) (0.4089) (0.3238)
dis int -1.051 -0.433 -0.454 -0.520
(0.0000)** (0.0337)* (0.0076)** (0.0019)**
exc int -0.238 -0.085 -0.245 -0.202
(0.0040)** (0.3824) (0.0021)** (0.0043)**
rd int 0.112 -0.138 0.254 0.113
(0.4280) (0.4197) (0.0030)** (0.3077)
adv int 0.255 0.048 0.130 0.170
(0.3423) (0.8394) (0.4627) (0.3184)
mkt int -0.118 -0.590 -0.152 -0.162
(0.2539) (0.0300)* (0.1439) (0.1211)
k int 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.0008)** (0.0001)** (0.0003)** (0.0002)**
leverage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.9085) (0.8043) (0.7362) (0.8379)
fore 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.6685) (0.7912) (0.7994) (0.8014)
i 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.5901) (0.0295)* (0.9964) (0.2819)
corp -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.9884) (0.2817) (0.6501) (0.8432)
dir 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.1767) (0.3678) (0.1656) (0.1875)
Observations 1713 1147 1979 2212
No.of groups 401 275 464 523
R-squared (within) 0.3035 0.3099 0.2980 0.2890
Robust p values in parentheses
+ signicant at 10%; * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%
30Table 7: Regressions for ROA dropping one Industry at a time...Table 6 contd.
Industry Ind-5 Ind-6 Ind-7 Ind-8
age -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.022
(0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)**
lsale 0.056 0.054 0.055 0.055
(0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)**
lsale2 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.0001)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)**
exp int 0.050 0.040 0.044 0.044
(0.0715)+ (0.1551) (0.1122) (0.1454)
imp int 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.2979) (0.3080) (0.3541) (0.3227)
dis int -0.487 -0.394 -0.512 -0.557
(0.0039)** (0.0084)** (0.0024)** (0.0037)**
exc int -0.204 -0.195 -0.203 -0.204
(0.0040)** (0.0045)** (0.0040)** (0.0047)**
rd int 0.103 0.105 0.106 0.124
(0.3650) (0.3551) (0.3477) (0.2610)
adv int 0.145 0.008 0.155 0.211
(0.3938) (0.9495) (0.3630) (0.2707)
mkt int -0.159 -0.174 -0.169 -0.177
(0.1290) (0.0993)+ (0.1063) (0.0950)+
k int 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.0002)** (0.0002)** (0.0002)** (0.0003)**
leverage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.7692) (0.7477) (0.7906) (0.7928)
fore 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.7182) (0.1466) (0.6915) (0.8479)
i 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.3223) (0.2967) (0.2457) (0.3234)
corp -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.9245) (0.7545) (0.8543) (0.8559)
dir 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.1795) (0.2491) (0.1176) (0.0803)+
Observations 2236 2131 2229 2110
No.of groups 503 523 494 530
R-squared (within) 0.2946 0.2956 0.2938 0.2953
Robust p values in parentheses
+ signicant at 10%; * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%
31Table 8: Regressions for ROA with time and rm dummies dropping some years.




age -0.023 -0.018 -0.021 -0.022 -0.024
(0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)**
lsale 0.056 0.062 0.054 0.050 0.050
(0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)**
lsale2 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.006
(0.0001)** (0.0111)* (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)**
exp int 0.044 0.026 0.045 0.037 0.037
(0.1090) (0.4298) (0.1081) (0.2777) (0.2792)
imp int 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.3284) (0.4164) (0.3903) (0.5616) (0.5796)
dis int -0.493 -0.670 -0.528 -0.476 -0.451
(0.0032)** (0.0016)** (0.0019)** (0.0084)** (0.0114)*
exc int -0.197 -0.263 -0.176 -0.197 -0.190
(0.0060)** (0.0022)** (0.0131)* (0.0064)** (0.0097)**
rd int 0.102 -0.032 0.098 0.100 0.094
(0.3683) (0.9055) (0.3680) (0.3839) (0.4187)
adv int 0.131 0.247 0.160 0.061 0.027
(0.4421) (0.2773) (0.3563) (0.7177) (0.8731)
mkt int -0.184 -0.154 -0.107 -0.230 -0.254
(0.0762)+ (0.2477) (0.4162) (0.0700)+ (0.0469)*
k int 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0003)** (0.0010)** (0.0003)**
leverage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.7819) (0.5087) (0.4746) (0.7670) (0.7570)
fore 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.6241) (0.7105) (0.3657) (0.4162) (0.3932)
i 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.2966) (0.3933) (0.2163) (0.1271) (0.1083)
corp 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.8756) (0.3437) (0.8614) (0.5774) (0.4764)
dir 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.1717) (0.4288) (0.2089) (0.1628) (0.1939)
Observations 2222 1698 2160 1907 1881
No.of groups 530 530 510 444 444
R-squared
(within)
0.2847 0.2099 0.3071 0.2930 0.2828
Robust p values in parentheses
+ signicant at 10%; * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%





exp int 0.044 (0.1047)
imp int 0.001 (0.3157)
dis int -0.507 (0.0019)**
exc int -0.202 (0.0044)**
rd int 0.109 (0.3395)
adv int 0.150 (0.3689)
mkt int -0.162 (0.1154)
k int 0.001 (0.0002)**
leverage 0.000 (0.8184)
fore: (.,10) -0.001 (0.4266)
fore: (10,50) 0.000 (0.5098)
fore: (50,.) 0.001 (0.1049)
i: (.,10) 0.001 (0.4124)
i: (10,50) 0.000 (0.4788)
i: (50,.) -0.001 (0.6224)
corp: (.,10) -0.000 (0.7479)
corp: (10,50) 0.000 (0.4796)
corp: (50,.) -0.001 (0.3393)
dir: (.,10) 0.001 (0.6470)
dir: (10,50) 0.000 (0.2197)
dir: (50,.) -0.001 (0.8014)
Observations 2251
No. of groups 530
R-squared(within) 0.2963
Robust p values in parentheses
+ signicant at 10%; * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%
33Table 10: Regressions with ownership group, time and rm dummies
ALL FORE FII CORP DIR
age -0.022 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021
(0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)**
lsale 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056
(0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)**
lsale2 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)**
exp int 0.044 0.043 0.045 0.043 0.042
(0.1025) (0.1173) (0.0985)+ (0.1116) (0.1211)
imp int 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.3332) (0.3185) (0.3227) (0.3304) (0.3153)
dis int -0.515 -0.499 -0.512 -0.500 -0.505
(0.0018)** (0.0027)** (0.0021)** (0.0027)** (0.0021)**
exc int -0.203 -0.202 -0.202 -0.204 -0.203
(0.0042)** (0.0043)** (0.0042)** (0.0038)** (0.0039)**
rd int 0.106 0.100 0.110 0.114 0.111
(0.3559) (0.4055) (0.3184) (0.2987) (0.3266)
adv int 0.157 0.149 0.157 0.151 0.153
(0.3487) (0.3774) (0.3538) (0.3711) (0.3625)
mkt int -0.156 -0.158 -0.156 -0.159 -0.164
(0.1358) (0.1310) (0.1385) (0.1303) (0.1164)
k int 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.0002)** (0.0002)** (0.0002)** (0.0002)** (0.0002)**
leverage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

















R-squared (within) 0.2955 0.2931 0.2932 0.2928 0.2930
Robust p values in parentheses (530 gropus and 2251 observations).
+ signicant at 10%; * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%
34Table 11: Regressions for other performance measures with time and rm dummies
Variables ROS Y S ROI ROE
age -0.083 0.001 -27.769 2.156
(0.0074)** (0.0038)** (0.0080)** (0.5271)
lsale 0.120 -0.013 128.425 2.421
(0.6928) (0.0285)* (0.1223) (0.3079)
lsale2 0.023 0.001 -0.893 0.570
(0.4687) (0.0981)+ (0.9368) (0.3457)
exp int 1.484 -0.009 -18.974 2.540
(0.1501) (0.3794) (0.7599) (0.8275)
imp int 0.102 -0.001 14.057 -0.004
(0.0023)** (0.1334) (0.0792)+ (0.9817)
dis int -6.151 -0.049 -7.927 41.379
(0.1032) (0.3948) (0.9848) (0.7584)
exc int -0.926 1.297 -453.352 -136.540
(0.3150) (0.0000)** (0.1771) (0.0222)*
rd int 0.088 -0.006 229.568 71.006
(0.8945) (0.7273) (0.3269) (0.4292)
adv int -6.040 0.053 156.867 12.347
(0.0356)* (0.4978) (0.7982) (0.9147)
mkt int -0.735 0.007 -86.177 -57.148
(0.2045) (0.7359) (0.7567) (0.3633)
k int -0.016 -0.000 3.545 -0.066
(0.0819)+ (0.1014) (0.1600) (0.4431)
leverage -0.000 -0.000 3.360 0.025
(0.5494) (0.4205) (0.1569) (0.6451)
fore 0.001 0.000 -0.283 0.729
(0.5410) (0.3069) (0.7943) (0.0051)**
i -0.000 -0.000 1.550 0.135
(0.8925) (0.9289) (0.2510) (0.7079)
corp -0.002 0.000 -1.452 0.202
(0.2956) (0.2851) (0.2215) (0.2374)
dir 0.001 0.000 0.500 0.228
(0.4266) (0.2550) (0.5571) (0.4841)
Observations 2251 2251 1694 2108
No. of groups 530 530 423 515
R-squared(within) 0.4116 0.7664 0.0506 0.0121
Robust p values in parentheses
+ signicant at 10%; * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%
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